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POTSHERDS

*Ostrakon, ostrakon, battered old sherd,
Black on ochre of pottery jar,
Meaningless scrawl, inscrutable word,
Smudges on clay, 'tis all that you are.*

*Spell us the score of the harvested seed,
Tally of herds and choice merchandise.
This you convey to such as can read,
Even though dust be his bones who buys.*

*Ostrakon, ostraka, pile upon pile,
Stablish the lineage, clear up the line
Apostolic of Greek on the Nile—
Born to mean service, your death is divine.*

—PIERRE DELACROIX

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RELIGION must indeed be a thing of the heart; but in order to elevate it from the region of subjective caprice and waywardness, and to distinguish between that which is true and false in religion, we must appeal to an objective standard. That which enters the heart must first be discerned by the intelligence to be true. It must be seen as having in its own nature a right to dominate feeling, and as constituting the principle by which feeling must be judged. In estimating the religious character of individuals, nations, or races, the first question is, not how they feel, but what they think and believe—not whether their religion is one which manifests itself in emotions, more or less vehement and enthusiastic, but what are the conceptions of God and divine things by which these emotions are called forth. Feeling is necessary in religion, but it is by the content or intelligent basis of a religion, and not by feeling, that its character and worth are determined.

—JOHN CAIRD

THE WAY OF THE WISE

A Meditation Concerning Philosophy

THOMAS WEARING

IN whimsical mood Robert Frost, the New England poet, points out the perils that beset the pathway of the thinker. The poem is found on page 96 of a collection published in 1936 under the title of "A Further Range."

"The last step taken found your heft
Decidedly upon the left.
One more would throw you on the right.
Another still—you see your plight.
You call this thinking, but it's walking.
Not even that, it's only rocking,
Or weaving like a stabled horse:
From force to matter and back to force,
From form to content and back to form,
From norm to crazy and back to norm,
From bound to free and back to bound,
From sound to sense and back to sound.
So back and forth. It almost scares
A man the way things come in pairs.
Just now you're off democracy
(With a polite regret to be),
And leaning on dictatorship;
But if you will accept the tip,
In less than no time, tongue and pen,
You'll be a democrat again.
A reasoner and good as such,
Don't let it bother you too much
If it makes you helpless please
And a temptation to the tease.
Suppose you've no direction in you,
I don't see but you must continue
To use the gift you do possess,
And sway with reason more or less.
I own I never really warmed
To the reformer or reformed,
And yet conversion has its place
Not halfway down the scale of grace.
So if you find you must repent
From side to side in argument,
At least don't use your mind too hard,
But trust my instinct—I'm a bard."

This poetic animadversion reminds one of a paragraph in Professor C. E. M. Joad's "Guide to Philosophy." The author hints at the elusiveness of the quarry in such words as these. "Philosophy is an exceedingly difficult subject and cannot with the best will in the world be made into an easy one. For one thing, the understanding of philosophy is frequently found to entail some knowledge of a number of other subjects. Physics and theology, history and biology, aesthetics and literature—all these are intermittent grist to the philosopher's mill, and he who would follow its grindings must have at least a nodding acquaintance with them. For another, it is exceedingly abstract. There are many, and they are not by any means the most stupid of our species, who will always find philosophy largely unintelligible. The twists and turns of the speculative reason, the hairsplitting distinctions, the abstractness of the thinking, the remoteness of the conclusions reached from the interests of ordinary life, the absence of agreed results—all these cannot but seem to many at best a monument of energy misplaced, at worst an irritating perversion of the powers and faculties of the human mind."¹

"To sit apart and think is a troublesome operation" wrote Professor George Pierce Baker of Harvard, when discussing "the mind of the undergraduate."² And assuredly to sit apart and think philosophically is never an easy task even for the mind of the most informed graduate or non-graduate of whatever age or clime. Yet wisdom is found this way. And wisdom comes down to the present from many and diverse avenues of human thinking. Robert Sencourt in the *Atlantic Monthly* for May, 1939, pays tribute to the late Pope Pius the Eleventh in a most informing and well-written article in which this paragraph, pertinent to our present inquiry, may be worth deep consideration. Professor Sencourt is Vice-Dean in the University of Egypt.

"One of the Pope's remarkable innovations was to allow in China the veneration of Confucius. In the moral and philosophic teachings of that ancient guide he saw something akin to the work of Plato and Aristotle, whom Raphael had painted on the walls of the Vatican in the centre of Greek and Roman writers. For this great humanist Pope had not forgotten that the Church draws her wisdom from every source where wisdom can be found."

To the whimsical warning of the poet, Robert Frost, let another be

¹ Joad, C. E. M.—*Guide to Philosophy*, p. 10.

² Baker, G. P.—*Essays of the Past and Present*, p. 599.

added; this from the poet-philosopher, George Santayana. William Lyon Phelps once wrote that the work of Plato would have perished had not Plato been poet as well as philosopher. The far future may hold the same verdict with regard to Santayana. Here is his famous sonnet. And it may well mark the threshold of the quiet retreat in which our meditation concerning philosophy takes place, where wisdom may choose to make her sanctuary.

"O world, thou choosest not the better part!
It is not wisdom to be only wise,
And on the inward vision close the eyes,
But it is wisdom to believe the heart.
Columbus found a world, and had no chart,
Save one that faith deciphered in the skies;
To trust the soul's invincible surmise
Was all his science and his only art.
Our knowledge is a torch of smoky pine
That lights the pathway but one step ahead
Across a void of mystery and dread.
Bid, then, the tender light of faith to shine
By which alone the mortal heart is led
Unto the thinking of the thought divine.

Professor Irwin Edman in "The Philosophy of Santayana" includes twelve sonnets of this poet-philosopher, giving first place to the one just cited, and, in his preface to the volume, Edman paraphrases Santayana when discussing "Reason in Religion" in language that states in prose what the sonnet says in poetry. The sentence runs thus: "Religion has clarified our ideals, as the language of prayer often illustrates, and made those ideals authoritative."

Bertrand Russell has not so far given evidence of heeding such admonitions. In describing the function of philosophy, while refusing to give a definition, he claims that "philosophy has suffered from its association with theology."³ But for his own part Viscount Russell measures the joy of the authentic philosopher according to the standards provided by religion. The conclusions of his more than three hundred page discussion may be worth quoting here.

It is sometimes thought that philosophy ought to aim at encouraging a good life. Now, of course, I admit that it should have this effect but I do not admit that it should have this as a conscious purpose. To begin with, when we embark upon the

³ Russell, B.—*Philosophy*, p. 3.

study of philosophy we ought not to assume that we already know for certain what the good life is; philosophy may conceivably modify our views as to what is good, in which case it will seem to the non-philosophical to have had a bad moral effect. That, however, is a secondary point. The essential thing is that philosophy is part of the pursuit of knowledge, and that we cannot limit this pursuit by insisting that the knowledge obtained shall be such as we should have thought edifying before we obtained it. I think it could be maintained with truth that ALL knowledge is edifying, provided we have a right conception of edification. When this appears to be not the case it is because we have moral standards based on ignorance. It may happen by good fortune that a moral standard based on ignorance is right, but if so knowledge will not destroy it; if knowledge can destroy it, it must be wrong. The conscious purpose of philosophy, therefore, ought to be solely to UNDERSTAND the world as well as possible, not to establish this or that proposition which is thought morally desirable. Those who embark upon philosophy must be prepared to question all their preconceptions, ethical as well as scientific; if they have a determination never to surrender certain philosophic beliefs, they are not in the frame of mind in which philosophy can be profitably pursued.

But although philosophy ought not to have a moral purpose, it ought to have certain good moral effects. Any disinterested pursuit of knowledge teaches us the limits of our power, which is salutary; at the same time, in proportion as we succeed in achieving knowledge, it teaches the limits of our impotence, which is equally desirable. And philosophical knowledge, or rather philosophical thought, has certain special merits not belonging in an equal degree to other intellectual pursuits. By its generality it enables us to see human passions in their just proportions, and to realize the absurdity of many quarrels between individuals, classes, and nations. Philosophy comes as near as possible for human beings to that large, impartial contemplation of the universe as a whole which raises us for the moment above our purely personal destiny. There is a certain asceticism of the intellect which is good as a part of life, though it cannot be the whole so long as we have to remain animals engaged in the struggle for existence. The asceticism of the intellect requires that, while we are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, we shall repress all other desires for the sake of the desire to know. While we are philosophising, the wish to prove that the world is good, or that the dogmas of this or that sect are true, must count as weaknesses of the flesh—they are temptations to be thrust on one side. But we obtain in return something of the joy, which the mystic experiences in harmony with the will of God. This joy

philosophy can give, but only to those who are willing to follow it to the end, through all its arduous uncertainties.

The world presented for our belief by a philosophy based upon modern science is in many ways less alien to ourselves than the world of matter as conceived in former centuries. The events that happen in our minds are part of the course of nature, and we do not know that the events which happen elsewhere are of a totally different kind. The physical world, so far as science can show at present, is perhaps less rigidly determined by causal laws than it was thought to be: one might, more or less fancifully, attribute even to the atom a kind of limited freewill. There is not need to think of ourselves as powerless and small in the grip of vast cosmic forces. All measurement is conventional, and it would be possible to devise a perfectly serviceable system of measurement according to which a man would be larger than the sun. No doubt there are limits to our power, and it is good that we should recognise the fact. But we cannot say what the limits are, except in a quite abstract way, such as that we cannot create energy. From the point of view of human life, it is not important to be able to CREATE energy; what is important is to be able to direct energy into this or that channel, and this we can do more and more as our knowledge of science increases. Since men first began to think, the forces of nature have oppressed them; earthquakes, floods, pestilences, and famines have filled them with terror. Now, at last, thanks to science, mankind is discovering how to avoid much of the suffering that such events have hitherto entailed. The mood in which, as it seems to me, the modern man should face the universe is one of quiet self-respect. The universe as known to science is not in itself either friendly or hostile to man, but it can be made to act as a friend if approached with patient knowledge. Where the universe is concerned, knowledge is the one thing needful. Man, alone of living things, has shown himself capable of the knowledge required to give him a certain mastery over his environment. The dangers to man in the future, or at least in any measurable future, come, not from nature, but from man himself. Will he use his power wisely? Or will he turn the energy liberated from the struggle with nature into struggles with his fellow-men? History, science, and philosophy all make us aware of the great collective achievements of mankind. It would be well if every civilised human being had a sense of these achievements and a realisation of the possibility of greater things to come, with the indifference which must result as regards the petty squabbles upon which the passions of individuals and nations are wastefully squandered.

Philosophy should make us know the ends of life, and the elements in life that have value on their own account. However our freedom may be limited in the casual sphere, we need admit no limi-

tations to our freedom in the sphere of values: what we judge good on its own account we may continue to judge good, without regard to anything but our own feeling. Philosophy cannot itself determine the ends of life, but it can free us from the tyranny of prejudice and from distortions due to a narrow view. Love, beauty, knowledge, and joy of life: these things retain their lustre however wide our purview. And if philosophy can help us to feel the value of these things, it will have played its part in man's collective work of bringing light into a world of darkness.⁴

After this glance at the conclusions Viscount Russell achieves as to the worth of philosophy, or of a philosophic attitude toward the universe and mankind, one may turn again to his opening remarks with regard to philosophy and its function. He is convinced that philosophy is the result of "an unusually obstinate attempt to arrive at real knowledge." What people accept as knowledge for the most part is marked by three defects: "it is cocksure, vague, and self-contradictory. The first step towards philosophy consists in becoming aware of these defects, not in order to rest content with a lazy scepticism, but in order to substitute an amended kind of knowledge which shall be tentative, precise, and self-consistent." Knowledge should be comprehensive, also, but science rather than philosophy makes for this quality in knowledge. Science deals with the fact in the raw and arranges the found facts under so-called scientific laws. Philosophy takes the facts as arranged, criticises this scientific knowledge, and attempts to discover a general harmony which will include the entire area occupied by the special sciences. With this understanding of what philosophy tries to do the author criticises human knowledge through twenty-seven chapters dealing with Man from Without, Part I, The Physical World, Part II, Man from Within, Part III, and The Universe, Part IV.

Along with Bertrand, Viscount Russell, may be placed another brilliant Englishman, more litterateur than philosopher in this specific case, who seems to think that religion can be dispensed with in one's view of life and the universe. The writer referred to is John Cowper Powys, whose volume, *The Meaning of Culture*, published by W. W. Norton and Company in 1929, has commanded considerable and continued interest in American academic circles through the decade since its appearance on this side of the Atlantic. His brother Llewellyn calls John a genius, and a pantheist who desires the naked earth under his feet and who when walking upon macadam or concrete feels his soul separated

⁴ Ibid. pp. 299-301.

from the roots of real living. He has lectured in forty of the forty-eight states of the American Union and has been popular these many years in cultured circles, so much so that he now makes his home in New York. A paragraph from the introduction to *The Meaning of Culture* will make clear the viewpoint from which Mr. Powys looks out on life.⁵ He writes; "The mental confusion and moral bewilderment of our age shows itself as much in the intensity of religious revivals as in the general decline of religious faith. What is aimed here is to find in the instinctive and rationalized habits of human culture itself a sort of working substitute for the simpler religious faith of the past, for its heroic synthesis of so many human activities and emotions; something, in fact, that shall at once awaken us to the magic of life, so overlaid and vulgarized by modern conditions, and calm us and steady us in our intelligent enjoyment of it." Mr. Powys through the volume of brilliant prose, deals first with the analysis of culture as different from philosophy, literature, poetry, painting, and religion, and then, in six concluding chapters, with the application of this culture to the phases of human activity that touch upon happiness, that oppose culture, that evoke love, that unite man and nature, that lead man in his reading, that link man with his fellows, and face man with destiny. It is the chapter on culture and philosophy that will engage attention at this stage of our meditation on "the way of the wise."

Mr. Powys feels that one cannot be cultured unless one has some kind of original philosophy. There must be "a WILL to philosophize at the very start. This implies a desire to focus such imaginative reason as we possess upon the mystery of life." The innermost self, according to this writer, is on close and continued examination found to be "a clear, hard, enclosed, secretive nucleus with a detached and independent existence of its own." And each individual possesses, whether he is aware of it or not, "A concretion of accumulated reactions gathered round this nucleus of personality." The cultured among these individuals are those who consciously protect this universe of reactions from disintegrated elements, allowing "for the most extreme idiosyncrasies of philosophical opinion. Half-educated people permit their personal vision to be interfered with, to be smoothed out and flattened out, by a slavish respect for modern science or by a conventional respect for traditional religion. The cultured person takes both these dogmatic authorities with a considerable pinch of salt. Science is not everything—

⁵ Powys, J. C.—*The Meaning of Culture*, p. 8.

nor is religion! The last word is with a certain free poetic humanism that uses both science and religion for its own purposes and is not dominated by either. An educated person can glibly describe to you what he wishes you to regard as his last ready-made philosophy. A cultured person often finds it very difficult to explain what his philosophy is; but when he does manage to articulate it you feel that this is what he has secretly and profoundly lived for many a long year. For in a cultured person's life intellectual snobbishness has ceased to exist. . . . What a perpetual stumbling-block, for instance, is the cultured person's innate predilection for combining extreme opposites in his thought and taste. His philosophical opinions will be found, as a rule, judged by the standards of the merely educated, to be at once startlingly revolutionary and startlingly reactionary. Thus Mr. Wells, valuable and sincere thinker though he is, will never quite satisfy a cultured taste because he is neither revolutionary enough nor reactionary enough. One always feels that a merely educated man holds his philosophical views as if they were so many pennies in his pocket. They are separate from his life. Whereas with a cultured man there is no gap or lacuna between his opinions and his life. Both are dominated by the same organic, inevitable fatality. They are WHAT HE IS." A Christian would say that only the Grace of God can close the gap; and that "fatality" is transmuted into destiny by free choice of ends.

After a page or two in which Mr. Powys breaks a lance with those whom he calls "pedants" and "philistines," he makes a plea for the employment of the aesthetic sense and the power of the imagination in fashioning a philosophy for the cultured individual. The pedant always tries to explain; he is interested in expounding down to the last detail the opinions of "Aristotle, of Hegel, of Spinoza." He is not interested in applying in vital form the implications of their philosophical teachings to "his own stream of consciousness." The philistine follows the illusion that all early systems of thought move forward in a steady evolutionary process, "watched over by some brisk dynamic Providence," and coming to a pinnacle occupied by the modern philosopher with his "supreme insight." Mr. Powys thinks the philistine is more dangerous and more to be avoided than the pedant. The cultured man will bring all philosophical systems into a delightful contemporaneity, all of them equally true and representing truth through an endless variety of expression. He will "feel" what each philosophy can impart. "What a planetary sensation, for example, dark, rank and sweet

as a hidden vice, flows through our nerves when we first apprehend the formidable conception of Schopenhauer's 'Absolute Will,' driving us forward on its heaving universal tide, until we escape its obsession by pure aesthetic contemplation or by a purer renunciation! What a world-drama of spiritual tension summons us to shake the dust of the market place from our feet as we vision the ice-cold heights touched by the 'eternal noon' of Nietzsche's Zarathustra! How exciting, in their sly, caressing feminine-feline logic are the iridescent arguments by which Bergson leads us to substitute for Reason itself some incredible process of intuitive under-life!" The cultured man looks at the world, not through any one set of windows colored by some particular philosopher as by a renowned artist. He will make his own stained-glass windows, with a tint from Plato, from Hegel a little scarlet; from Hegel a slight yellow. He will not be swept away by scientific catchwords but will sprinkle a little "attic salt" on modern theories. He will not be enslaved by the novel logic of "a Russell or a Whitehead, by any new generalization of psychoanalyst or behaviorist."

The last two paragraphs in this chapter on "Culture and Philosophy" may be quoted in their entirety in order that the author be understood in his general attitude towards the philosophers ancient and modern.

We learn further, as our culture brings our philosophy into closer and closer touch with life, that the truth of each great system lies in its general atmosphere rather than in any unanswerable train of argument. No man, however learned, can be called a cultured man while there remains an unbridged gap between his reading and his life. It is for this reason that the deliberate tone of character evoked by the old stoics is a nobler and truer philosophic temper than any rationalized realism or idealism such as leaves the will undisciplined and the imagination undeveloped.

A philosophy of one's own, grown tough and flexible amid the shocks of the world, is a far more important achievement than the ability to expound the precise differences between the great philosophic schools of thought. It is for this reason that the writers of what might be called an applied philosophy—such as Plato, Montaigne, Goethe, Wordsworth, Emerson, Pater, Proust—are far more valuable to one's individual growth than Hume or Kant or Spencer or Whitehead. The chief advantage of a wide reading in philosophy is that it gives one both the scepticism to stand up against every dogmatic claim and the imagination to treat with reverence and humility every original hint and illuminating suggestion.

Mr. Powys is not alone in his strictures concerning writers like Whitehead. In the well-written volume *"Guide to Philosophy,"* mentioned at the first step of this pilgrimage, Professor Joad writes of the extreme difficulty in the understanding of Whitehead because not only are this philosopher's ideas "intrinsically difficult to grasp," and are in process of constant change, but also because he writes obscurely, using terms that are unfamiliar and employing "familiar terms in novel senses." In a note at the foot of page 560 in the volume Professor Joad explains that he does not wish to scare readers away from Whitehead. He points out that in the book he is restricted to the metaphysics of Whitehead and urges attention to this philosopher's writings in ethics, religion, politics and history, which are informed by his metaphysical point of view and are highly important in themselves, containing flashes of penetrative insight, and displaying a "humane and cultivated liberalism," "in that sense of 'liberalism' in which the word stands for all that most separates our species from the animal creation, for all that our modern civilization most desperately needs." In closing Professor Joad recommends Whitehead's "Science and the Modern World" and "Adventure of Ideas."

In July of 1929 my wife and I disembarked from the Empress of Australia at Southampton, signed the register at the Polygon Hotel, a quaintly beautiful hostelry at the edge of the city farthest from the docks, and then went for a walk. Soon we approached a well-kept place operated by the Toc-H movement, where men who had seen service in the World War and who had active interests in helping youth, teaching classes and other groups, could live at a nominal cost. Over the gateway was this motto, "Abandon Rank, all ye who enter here." We visited the establishment and found that all the members actually carried out the ideal and those who had during the war been in high or low positions came together in a brotherhood life entirely free from distinctions of rank or class. Of course when first looking at the motto the famous words of Dante's *Divina Commedia* came to mind; "Abandon hope all ye who enter here," with reference to the entrance to the underworld, and it seemed to me that Toc-H had made a very happy and suggestive adaptation of the ancient saying.

In this meditation upon the place of philosophical thinking in human life somehow these injunctions began to stir and to emerge from the limbo of things for the time being laid aside. For in the long quest of the philosophers through the centuries since the mind of man first

awakened into purposive activity those who have walked humbly have fared farthest. In this phase of mankind's striving alone has been brought to fulfilment that remarkable prediction of the Galilean, "The meek shall inherit the earth. In the way of the wise all worldly rank must be abandoned if the pilgrimage is to be worth while. Philosophy, like Death, is the great Leveller. Still more significant appeared the admonition which Dante saw inscribed in dark, forbidding colors, over the portals of the entrance to the Inferno: *Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch'entrate!* Assuredly in like manner must be designated the realm inhabited by the philosophically minded amongst the sons of men. The philosopher is forever in search of a certainty that forever eludes his questing mind. For him every end is also a beginning. As Bertrand Russell puts it, "The pursuit of precision destroys certainty." R. G. Collingwood sets the same idea forward in this fashion, after discussing philosophy for three hundred and five pages in his *Speculum Mentis*. "We set out," writes this Oxford philosopher, "to construct a map of knowledge on which every legitimate form of human experience should be laid down, its boundaries determined, and its relations with its neighbors set forth. We assumed that such a map could be made: imperfect and abstract, like all maps, but none the less valuable to those whose task it is to explore and cultivate the country of the mind. We assumed, that is to say, the real existence of art, religion, and so forth as distinct forms of experience, forms not wholly separable or independent, but at least mutually exclusive, relatively autonomous and capable of some kind of delimitation.

"Such a map of knowledge is impossible" continues Professor Collingwood, "and our trouble is well spent if it produces no other result than the recognition that this is so. There are no autonomous and mutually exclusive forms of experience, and, what is more, it is in no one's interest to assume that there are." In reading these findings of the philosopher one may feel that he is going altogether too far and, perhaps quote Lord Tennyson to him.

"Hold thou the good: define it well:
For fear divine Philosophy
Should push beyond her mark, and be
Procuress to the Lords of Hell."

But Tennyson, in the very next canto in his philosophical poem, *In Memoriam*, exclaims in utter, epistemological pessimism, "Behold, we know not anything."

On the other hand Professor Collingwood closes his careful and scholarly investigation with clear and inspiring optimism. This is what he finally decides: "There is and can be no map of knowledge, for a map means an abstract of the main features of a country, laid before the traveller in advance of his experience of the country itself. Now no one can describe life to a person who stands on the threshold of life. The maxims given by age to youth are valueless not because age means nothing by them but because what it means is just its own past life. To youth they are empty words. The life of the spirit cannot be described except by repeating it; an account of it would just be itself. This is equally the case whether we present our map in the form of a group of categories or concepts which are supposed to reappear as units of thought in the texture of experience; or as a group of laws somehow suspended above it which govern its course; or a group of presuppositions which lie beyond and behind its very beginning, and condition, through its beginning, its whole development; or a world of objects over against it, in beating itself against which it comes to the use of its own powers; or a series of stages through which, as along a railway line, it necessarily runs. All these assertions of something other than the absolute mind itself are versions of a single error: the error of abstraction, of failing to realize that subject and object, condition and conditioned, ground and consequence, particular and universal, can only be distinctions which fall within one and the same whole, and that this whole can only be the infinite fact which is the absolute mind. A fact which has anything outside is not the concrete fact. If that which falls outside it is its own law or nature, we have fallen into the abstraction which tears apart the individual into particular and universal; if another fact, we have torn apart the individual into two individuals unrelated and therefore both fictitious."

Our inquiry has not only abolished the notion of a map of knowledge distinct from knowledge itself: it has also abolished the notion of an external world other than the mind. It has not, of course, abolished the distinction between subject and object: on the contrary, it has established our right to use that distinction by showing its necessity in the life of thought. It is no more abolished than are the distinctions between truth and error, good and evil, particular and universal: these distinctions are only abolished by the "coincidentia oppositorum" which is the suicide of abstract thought, and conserved by the synthesis of opposites which is the life of concrete thought. Just as we began by assuming a man of

knowledge, so we began by assuming an external world, a world of which we could say with the realists that it really is what, errors apart, we think it to be: a world of which we could even say that it was what it was irrespective of any ignorance or error of our own about it. Our position at the start was wholly realistic, and there is a sense in which it is realistic to the end. But we did not—and this is where realists tend to go wrong—assume that “error apart” is a clause which need not be taken seriously. We did not assume that any one form or experience could be accepted already, in its main lines, wholly free from error. Led by this principle, we found that the real world was implied, but not asserted, in art, asserted, but not thought out, in religion; thought out, but only subject to fictitious assumptions, in science; and therefore in all these we found an ostensible object—the work of art, God, the material universe—which was confessedly a figment and not the real object. The real object is the mind itself, as we now know.

But in abolishing the notion of an external world other than the mind we do not assert any of the silly nonsense usually described by unintelligent critics as idealism. We do not assert that the trees and hills and people of our world are “unreal,” or “mere ideas in my mind,” still less that matter is nothing but a swarm of mind-particles. The very essence of trees and hills and people is that they should be not myself but my objects in perception: they are not subjective but objective, not states of myself but facts that I know. None the less, my knowing them is organic to them: it is because they are what they are that I can know them, because I know them that they can be what to me they really are. They and I alike are members of one whole, a whole which the destruction of one part would in a sense destroy throughout, as the death of our friend darkens for us the very light of the sun.

The truth is not some perfect system of philosophy: it is simply the way in which all systems, however perfect, collapse into nothingness on the discovery that they are only systems, only external worlds over against the knowing mind and not that mind itself.

For the life of the mind consists of raising and solving problems; problems in art, religion, science, commerce, politics, and so forth. The solution of these problems does not leave behind it a sediment of ascertained fact, which grows and solidifies as the mind's work goes on. Such a sediment is nothing but the externality of a half-solved problem: when the problem is fully solved the sediment of information disappears and the mind is left at liberty to go on. Philosophy, therefore, is not a prerogative kind of knowledge immune from this reabsorption into the mind's being: it is nothing but the recognition that this reabsorption is necessary and is indeed the end and crown of all knowledge, the self-recognition of the mind in its own mirror.

The pilgrim, seeking to find the pathway of the wise, may travel with John Dewey in his "quest for certainty" but he is likely to come to the same conclusion as does Professor Collingwood. This will keep him humble and, at the same time, hopeful, for he will realize that the march of the multitudes of minds across the centuries since man first began to think has not been a wild goose chase. As the individual "rounds to a separate mind" so the collective mind of humanity has been enlarged and enriched in the immemorial search after wisdom. The pilgrim will also, if he is truly wise, be grateful to writers like John Powys for the color and the warmth with which their thinking invests the various areas of mental achievement but he will firmly refuse to banish religion from the central scheme of his thought processes. Renan, with a frosty gleam in his eye, wrote this memorable sentence in his *"Histoire du Peuple d' Israël,"* Les religions, comme les philosophies, sont toutes vaines; mais la religion, pas plus que la philosophie, n'est vaine."

Alfred, Lord Tennyson, in the introductory section of "In Memoriam," translates for his readers an attitude which seems to be of especial significance as one looks over the realms dominated by philosophy and religion in our time.

Our little systems have their day;
 They have their day and cease to be;
 They are but broken lights of thee,
 And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

We have but faith: we cannot know;
 For knowledge is of things we see;
 And yet we trust it comes from thee,
 A beam in darkness, let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
 But more of reverence in us dwell;
 That mind and soul, according well,
 May make one music as before,

But vaster. We are fools and slight;
 We mock thee when we do not fear;
 But help thy foolish ones to bear;
 Help thy vain worlds to bear thy light.

And here let an end be made. For in these Victorian stanzas are elements that may help the traveler keep both his faith and his footing in the way of the wise. The twentieth century, in all of its phases, needs more of the "lux benigna" so poignantly hymned by John Henry Newman.

REMAKING LIFE¹

JUSTIN WROE NIXON

“REMAKING LIFE” is the title of the Cole Lectures for 1939 by President Albert W. Beaven, which have just been issued in book form by the Cokesbury Press. Those who heard these lectures when they were delivered at Vanderbilt University last April must have been stirred by them. Now that they have been printed the churches at large and particularly the Alumni of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School will be interested in the challenge which they present.

In the Preface to the lectures, the author makes the point that Communism and Nazism are essentially rival faiths which are contesting with Christianity for the soul of modern man. The alliance of these rivals in the Hitler-Stalin compact weakens their appeal and Christianity thus has “a clearer field” to become the world’s central faith. Whether Christianity will be able to avail itself of this opportunity depends upon whether it can become again a life-changing force. To the need of such a Christianity, and to the means by which it can help to remake life these lectures are devoted.

The argument of the lectures runs somewhat as follows: The church today is in a storm, a storm which tests it to its very foundations like that storm which Jesus described in the Sermon on the Mount which beat upon the house built upon the sand, or upon the rock. But there is nothing new about storms. They are incident to the life of the church in a hard world. A particular feature of the present difficult situation of the church is the rise of Communism and Nazism with their anti-christian ideologies. The church must accept the challenge which these movements bring and develop its faith and mobilize its resources to the end that it may become a strong church.

How can the church become strong? Only through producing enough “quality” Christians. “The essence of Jesus’ words would seem to be that the church can stand any attack, and can go on with power, if the people who comprise its fellowship actually live their Christianity, proving the reality of their profession by a change from selfishness to Christlikeness in their lives; and standing by their profession, go out to live it in all their relationships.”

Now “the power of Christianity to create quality in the character of people is best proved by its ability to change the direction of men’s lives

¹ Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1939. Price, \$2.00.

toward the purpose and will of God." This requires a shift within the soul of man from an "I-centered" to an "other-centered" type of life. How may that change be secured? God can work this change if man will co-operate with Him through the power of choice. In the Christian religion the direction of the change is set by Jesus Christ. The author quotes Professor Samuel L. Hamilton of New York University to the effect that "religious living is giving the best you have to the highest you know." "To Christians that highest value is incarnated in the Person of Jesus Christ."

Christianity involves an initial commitment to Jesus Christ, and thus a change from an "I-centered" to a "Christ-centered" life. But it involves more than an initial choice. It means a life of continuous choices in the direction of Christ. Only such a life can be one of continuous growth.

Can Christianity really change life in this fashion? Here one meets all the psychologies which assert that the lives of men are determined by conditions beyond their control. These psychologies, the author points out, have reported many things about man which we did not know before, as the X-ray machine enables us to see elements of the human body we could not see before. But it would be a mistake to think that the new knowledge we have of man gained by psychology or the X-ray is more important than some of the things we have always known about man, for example, his consciousness of having the power of choice. "Choice in man is still the hallmark of the divine. Man knows it, not by the permission of science, but by the deepest elemental conviction of his being."

Man *can* co-operate with God in remaking himself. The author brings together facts out of his reading and experience to prove that this is true. Certainly the great contemporary rivals of Christianity are not modest about their ability to change life. They do change it. Why should not Christians believe that their faith also can change life?

The lectures then deal with the means by which the church can bring its life-changing message to bear upon men. It can change men through the ministry of the pulpit. Never was the world so influenced by the spoken word as today. Some of the methods of appeal employed by those who use the spoken word to influence men are sinister to the last degree. This is particularly true of some of the uses to which the radio is being put. But the church must use for good ends the new mechanical means which are so frequently used for evil ends. The pulpit must

proclaim the great ideas of the Christian faith balancing thought with emotion in the presentation of these ideas. Then it must follow up the public address with conferences and discussion groups which bring the ideas to bear upon every-day life.

The church can change men through the fellowship it offers in various associations. Interesting suggestions for the training of Christians in evangelism and other forms of Christian service are brought forth from the author's own experience. Finally the church can change men through securing their devotion to a great cause. Communism and Nazism make this appeal to their adherents. Christianity cannot hope to win youth today without it. What is the cause today which can release in men's lives the energies released by the great causes of the past? Here the author confesses that we lack vision. Perhaps our institutions of religion with their vested interests impair our vision. How may Christianity under the leadership of Christ which is universal in its appeal and timeless in its authority—how may Christianity become the world's central and unifying hope? This is the enquiry implicit in the last pages of the book.

We have marked down here in outline the trail of thought which one follows through this volume. But such an outline conveys hardly a suggestion of the illustrations drawn from the experience of the author as a pastor, and as a counselor of religious enterprises which light up the trail. Nor does it reveal the style of presentation which combines an honest determination to face the facts with a glowing purpose to aid the church in its service to its Master and His Cause in an hour of trial, which may yet be one of triumph.

The readers of this book who know Dr. Beaven as a man will find here the same naturalness, frankness and sincerity which have always characterized his sermons and addresses. This sincerity was never more evident than in his invitation to us to join in the quest for the enkindling vision. In his summons to this quest he voices the longing of this generation of Christians.

CAN PROTESTANTISM FACE THE FACTS?

HENRY BURKE ROBINS

PROTESTANTISM has a long history, much longer, indeed, than the four hundred odd years since Martin Luther nailed his theses to the church door in Wittenberg. For Protestantism is heir to the entire catholic Christian tradition, a tradition concerning the nature, content and importance of which there has never been, and is not today, a complete Protestant consensus.

Historical method, increasingly recognized since the early nineteenth century as relevant to the interpretation of the Bible, is of a piece with the whole approach of the modern world to its past. The past which it restores is replete with paradox and anachronism, the presence of which precipitates a dilemma for contemporary Protestantism, moved in wide sections of it by an ecumenical spirit. What shall Protestantism do with its past? Face the facts and fund the true values, while at the same time rejecting that which does not lend itself creatively to life in its changing expression; or ignore the facts and erect the ecclesiastical customs and formulas of that past into a perpetually ordained pattern? This dilemma modern Protestantism faces as it tries to move toward ecumenicity.

Dr. Conrad Henry Moehlman, James B. Colgate Professor of the History of Christianity in Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, offers us an arresting and illuminating "Historical Study of the Survival Value of Protestantism" in his new work just published by Harper & Brothers.¹ In ten concise chapters a comprehensive array of data requisite to the understanding of Protestantism's dilemma and suggestive of a way out is made available. After briefly sketching the emergence of Protestantism's challenge, the reader's attention is at once directed to a study of certain principal aspects of the Protestant faith, as symbolized or expressed in the Apostles' Creed, Christian baptism, the Christian eucharist, the Christian church; in which study the wide divergence of view within Protestantism with respect to these matters is indicated and its background given us in due perspective. Then follows a study of the fundamental creeds, from the Apostles' Creed to the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan symbol, in which we are shown

¹ *Protestantism's Challenge*. Conrad Henry Moehlman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939. Pp. 286. \$2.50.

how they came into being. For contrast, the brief contemporary statement of the National Council of Congregational Churches is set over against them.

It is shown that all Protestant churches without exception idealize their past and continue to defend their idealization of it. Not the least striking, perhaps the most vivid *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole procedure, is the "myth" of apostolic succession, a late emergent in Anglicanism. The church, in the light of historical criticism, turns out to have had quite a different origin and history than such dogmas assume. A critical study of the earlier Christians and their sacraments calls for a reconstruction of the popular account of the rise and development of both baptism and the Lord's Supper.

A return from the Christ of the creeds to the Jesus of the New Testament is "like coming out of a stifling room and breathing the invigorating air of outdoors." Yet there is a very notable development in the thought of the New Testament itself concerning the Founder of Christianity, a movement which historical method alone can adequately recover. Tradition, moreover, has done an age-long injustice to Judaism through its persistent literalistic interpretation of Matt. 27:25 and John 19:15; since, as critics have shown, the Jews neither cried out "His blood be upon us and our children," nor did they publicly choose Caesar as king. Christians ought, then, in all decency, to "bring their histories, commentaries, Sunday-school lessons, etc., into accord with the findings of scholarship." After a critical study of the earliest story of the Cross, we are told that "precisely what happened when the Roman procurator arrested the prophet of Nazareth and condemned him as a revolutionary, history does not know."

In the concluding chapter, under the caption "What Now Protestantism?," Dr. Moehlman points out that while original Protestantism wished to return to Jesus, it was never able to do so "because the essential historical data and method were not available." Now that they are, what will Protestantism do? It can, if it will, push beyond the theologized figure to the Prophet of Nazareth. It can discern what he thought about God, about man, about the better community, and about the good life. And by taking his ideals seriously it can "accept the challenge it has constructed for itself by living in such a large way in the area of mediaeval rather than original Christianity." The more than fifty pages of this concluding chapter will richly repay careful

study. The appeal is directly to the thought of Jesus himself, in an interpretative context, to be sure.

The trouble with contemporary Protestantism is that it is stuck fast in essential mediaevalism; if once it could get back to the vital realities of the Founder, and could adapt a truly objective attitude toward its own past, "the modern churches might easily unite in a vital fellowship adequate to the needs of the present age." Dr. Moehlman's argument, it should be pointed out, is based upon a very extensive appeal to source material. The work shows intimate acquaintance with critical scholarship, and the results which the author has achieved are the fruitage of many years of careful investigation.

Whether or not Protestantism cares to be historically realistic remains to be seen. Certainly the ecumenical movement to date has exhibited no rash tendency to renounce mediaevalism. But it may be safely predicted that any movement toward unity which bases primarily upon a theological formula and an approved if minimum ecclesiastical pattern will find itself eventually frustrate through the very movement toward an ampler life in the individual soul and the social order which we call the Christian religion. The work here reviewed carries its own credentials and speaks for itself. No thoughtful minister or Christian leader should neglect it.

A NEGLECTED APPROACH TO THE JEWISH PROBLEM

GEORGE RICKER BERRY

NO one questions that the problem of the Jews in the modern world is a serious one. They are being persecuted by several nations, the ultimate purpose, in some cases, being their complete banishment. There is discrimination against them in various walks of life in most other countries.

This is, however, no new situation. While the conditions have varied from time to time, it is nevertheless true that there has been a certain amount of discrimination against the Jews, and often active persecution, for more than two thousand years.

Many causes have been assigned for this state of affairs. No doubt Christians are much to blame because they have frequently shown an unchristian attitude toward the Jews. Unquestionably the Jews have been subject to the jealousy of others by reason of their success in business. Doubtless Jews have sometimes shown a greed for gain and a shrewdness, amounting at times to trickery, in business operations which aroused resentment. (But others than Jews have done similar things.) There is much force in the position of Lewis Browne¹ that the Jews are essentially city-minded, and most other people country-minded, his solution being that each party should modify its position in this respect.

None of these assigned causes goes to the root of the matter. The same may be said of the view that the hostility is because the Jews consider themselves a chosen people, and hence have a more or less carefully hidden sense of superiority to all other peoples. The chosen people idea is frequently expressed in the Old Testament.

The fact is, of course, that the Jews are not at all peculiar in holding the view that they are a chosen people. Many other nations all through the course of history have had the same thought. But in other cases the idea has perished with the overthrow of the nation. The Jews are simply peculiar in having cherished tenaciously this idea in spite of the downfall of their nation. They have been much encouraged in this by Christians. Because the Christians adopted the Old Testament as canonical, they have quite generally endorsed the idea that the Jews are a chosen people, and have thought that, as such, they are being reserved,

¹ *How Odd of God.*

in the providence of God, for some distinguished and helpful destiny in the future. This whole idea should be rejected as erroneous and mischievous; it is, in fact, more and more being abandoned by the Jews themselves. The Old Testament prophets, who have given currency to their conviction of the future of Israel as an elect nation, were no more infallible at this point than in many of their other predictions. This reason also for the current attitude toward the Jews, important as it is, cannot be considered the fundamental one.

In view of the continual and more or less active hostility to the Jews for more than two thousand years, one is led inevitably to ask whether there is anything in the ideas or customs of the Jews themselves which may furnish the real explanation.

When the Pentateuch was finally adopted by the Jews, probably about 400 B. C., the long struggle between prophets and priests for leadership in Israel was virtually ended with the triumph of the priests. From that time on the law became the dominant force in Jewish religious life, and hence in all their important ideas and customs. Jews who were careless about the law generally became merged with the Gentiles. But those who were true to the law thereby shut themselves within an enclosure and shut out the rest of the world. Many Jews by that time were living outside of Palestine, from necessity or choice. But all the faithful considered themselves first of all citizens of Palestine, and only secondarily citizens of the countries where they dwelt. They paid taxes to the temple at Jerusalem, they made pilgrimages to it, their thoughts centered about it.

The one thing above all others in the law that kept the Jews from free intercourse with other peoples was the code of dietary laws. These laws not only forbade the eating of pork, but also prescribed that any animal for food should be killed in a specific way, it must be kosher, to use the present-day term. Rabbinical regulations also played their part in making this barrier more formidable. One of the favorite rabbinical principles is this: Make a fence around the law. This means to avoid not simply what the law forbids, but also anything that comes close to that act. The most conspicuous illustration of this process is in the matter of meat and milk. The law says, in three passages with identical wording, Ex. 23:19b, Ex. 34:26b, and Dt. 14:21b: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in its mother's milk." This was originally, no doubt, the prohibition of a pagan rite. The process of fence-building has progressed through several stages. The first step was the prohibition

of cooking meat of any kind and milk together. Several other steps followed. It was forbidden to eat milk or any milk product after meat without an interval of several hours between them, to avoid their mingling in the process of digestion. Milk could be eaten before meat, since it was regarded as easier of digestion. It was forbidden to cook meat and milk in the same dishes. It was finally forbidden to use the same cloths in washing and drying cooking vessels for the two purposes. Consequently, in an orthodox Jewish household, there are two complete sets of cooking dishes, with the accompanying cloths, one for meat and one for milk.²

The result of the dietary laws of the Pentateuch, plus rabbinical regulations, has been to make it impossible that Jews should mingle freely in a social way with other people, for they risked ceremonial defilement by eating food when they did not know the manner of its preparation. The Jews in foreign lands lived in groups of their own, not simply because of clannishness, although that was a part of it, but principally because their dietary laws, derived from the law and from rabbinical regulations, made a barrier between them and other people. This has been true all through the centuries, the Jews have lived apart from others. While this has frequently been commanded by law, it remains true that it would inevitably have happened in any case, because of this barrier separating them from others.

These dietary laws were not sanitary in their origin, such an idea being unknown in ancient times. They are based upon the idea of taboo. The taboo conception was widely prevalent in primitive society, but gradually ceased to be important as life became complex. It is a primitive survival, which fits badly into the conditions of modern life.

It seems to me that it is the law, with special reference to the dietary regulations, plus rabbinical commands based upon the law, which has through all the centuries been the fundamental cause of the separation between Jews and non-Jews. This has been a barrier surrounding the Jews and shutting them off from free intercourse with other people. The Jews in every nation, by being thus shut off, have been an alien element. When there is an alien element in the human body, such as a bullet, it is a constant source of irritation, until finally nature builds a wall around it, shutting off the rest of the body from it. Similarly

² This set of rabbinical regulations first made an impression on my mind when I was told about them by Rabbi Hirsch, when I had the privilege of studying under him years ago at the University of Chicago.

society has found this alien element irritating, and has erected barriers against it.

The separation between Jews and non-Jews, therefore, has been the direct result of their adherence to traditional customs. The wall between Jews and others is one which they have themselves erected. This has, of course, led to suspicion and distrust on the part of others, and to many false accusations. But the primary responsibility for this situation rests upon the Jews.

The Zionist movement, designed to help the Jews, has actually made their condition worse. It has emphasized the national idea in Judaism, and hence has led many Jews to think that they are Jews first and citizens of the countries where they live second. When the Jews themselves do not think in this manner, there is a natural tendency for others to think of them in these terms.

Modern reformed Judaism, it will be said, has given up the election idea, and has abandoned the ancient ritual taboos. Why, it may be asked, has this not accomplished more in improving the position of the Jews?

It must be remembered that reformed Judaism has its principal strength in the United States. There is no organized movement of this kind elsewhere which has much influence. It is also true that reformed Judaism retains to a large extent the traditional habit of mind. Reformed Jewish leaders have repeatedly expressed themselves as opposed to marriage with Gentiles. With that attitude, social intercourse between Jews and others is materially restricted.

So much for the cause. What of the cure? The favorite solution at the present time, proposed by the Zionists, that the Jews should have a country of their own where they would be free to follow their own customs, seems to me impossible. Not to mention other weighty difficulties, Palestine could, at best, accommodate but a small part of the oppressed Jews of the world, and no other section of territory seems available which might be occupied only by Jews. The principal difficulty is that the Jews during many centuries have become thoroughly transformed from their early agricultural estate into a commercial and professional people. It is impossible for any large number of them to be turned back again into farmers and pioneers. The results of the Palestine experiment show this conclusively. The Jews in Palestine flock into the cities, where many of them live under very undesirable

conditions.³ Hendrik Willem Van Loon calls the movement "top-heavy." This top-heavy condition is shown by the figures of the distribution of the Jewish population in Palestine. According to the most conservative estimates not more than 25% of the present Jewish inhabitants of Palestine are actually settled on the land, and some put it at not more than 15%. Any great increase in the Jewish population would inevitably make this mal-distribution more pronounced.

The State of Vermont has a population of about 350,000. Palestine, with approximately the same extent of territory, has at the present time an (estimated) population of not less than 400,000 Jews and 900,000 Arabs, a total of 1,300,000. It is a question, therefore, whether Palestine is not now seriously over-populated. This large number of inhabitants in Palestine is only possible because there has been in recent years considerable progress in irrigation and in manufacturing; the possibilities of much further progress along those lines, however, are distinctly problematical. Of course, large subsidies for the colonies, with money raised abroad, are necessary every year.

I have indicated what I believe to be the fundamental cause of the Jewish difficulties. I think the solution, so far as any is possible, must be sought along the same line. To my mind, it would have been better, not only for the rest of the world but also for the Jews themselves, if centuries ago they had broken down this barrier of separation so that they could have mingled freely with other peoples. This doubtless would have meant intermarriage. Now it is rather late for that remedy, and I can see no good solution. However the only possibility of permanent improvement in the situation seems to me to be along that line.

This means that each Jew should think of himself principally as an individual, rather than as a member of a race or religion. If Jews should become accustomed to doing this, it would be much easier for others to regard them likewise. The Jews are commonly thought of in the mass, and are praised or blamed collectively. Such a grouping of people as a mass is the mark of a superficial and indiscriminating judgment. The world should become accustomed to thinking of the Jews as individuals, and treating each one on his own merits. This would inevitably result in a much more equitable treatment of them.

Of course it will be said that if Jews mingle freely with others and intermarry with them they will become Christians. That does not necessarily follow. If Judaism is a vital religion, it can hold its own.

³ Van Loon, Hendrik W., *This Week Magazine*, January 1, 1939.

If it is not vital, it does not make much difference what one stays away from whether it is a synagogue or a church.

The Old Testament speaks with two voices, one the voice of the law, the other the voice of the prophets and the psalmists. For over two thousand years the Jews have listened almost exclusively to the voice of the law, and this has led to their separation from other people. It is becoming continually more and more apparent that their traditional status as a separate people is not an asset but a liability. The voice of the law is that of a static religion, looking toward the past; the voice of the prophets and psalmists is that of a living religion, looking to the present and the future. The glory of Judaism is in the utterances of prophets and psalmists which have thrilled religious hearts in all ages. The Jews might well heed the words of that great anonymous prophet whose message is recorded in the book of Micah, 6:8, "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth Yahweh require of thee, but to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God?"

Many Jews in the modern world under the stress of business competition have been obliged to disregard the Sabbath law. It should not be difficult for them to take a further step and recognize that the law, with its rabbinical interpretations, belongs to an age long past, and cannot be adjusted to modern conditions. That simply means listening to the spiritual voice of Judaism, rather than to the voice which stresses its outward form.

FLIGHT FROM REALITY

OREN HULING BAKER

IN her novel *If I Have Four Apples*,¹ Josephine Lawrence utilizes the common tendency to solve problems by avoiding them as the basis for an interesting excursion into the ways of the human psyche. Allowing for the artistry which accompanies good story-telling, the picture is essentially sound and carries meanings which extend beyond the immediate purposes of the author. Viewing the record, any observant pastor will be able to detect attitudes which, in whole or in part, belong to persons in his own parish. Moreover, if the implications are fully traced out, one discovers afresh, in terms of a limited situation, the sweep and power of social forces with which even the most sophisticated intellectual must contend. The story, in fact, is so much like a generalized case record that it has a high degree of relevance for the thinking of all who seek a better understanding of the human problem. It is with this end in view that the present analysis is undertaken.

Miss Lawrence sets forth the main issue as it appears on the surface in her description of a familiar family situation. Mr. and Mrs. Hoe are average city-dwellers. They have been married twenty-three years and are now in their latter forties. Their three children, Darthula, Dallas and Sythia are respectively 22, 18 and 15 years of age. Mr. Hoe is a shipping clerk who earned, before the depression, \$50 per week, while his wife, Rose, earned during the same period \$25 per week. The economic crisis, however, has reduced Mr. Hoe's salary to \$30. This is supplemented by Mrs. Hoe who, after being unemployed for two years, is receiving \$15 per week as a clerk in a department store. With the addition of \$5 which they receive from a third floor tenant and an occasional contribution from Darthula, the older daughter, they have a total weekly income which ranges from \$50 to \$55 as compared with an income of more than \$75 during the pre-depression days. The two younger children are in high school, with Dallas looking forward to graduation at the end of the year.

The members of this family may be characterized by reference to their dominant ambitions. Mr. Hoe rests his destiny upon the firm and unshakable belief that it is the duty of every man to own his own home. Consequently he buys a \$10,000 house which was built

¹ New York: The Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1935. Price, \$2.50.

by an improvement company on the mass production plan during the boom days of the 1920s. The property is covered by two mortgages, the first held by the company and the second by Mrs. Hoe's mother, Mrs. Darbac.

Every moment of her life, Mrs. Hoe is ruled by two absorbing passions—first, to have all of the modern domestic appliances her house will hold, and second, to help her children, particularly Dallas and Sythia, to get ahead, or as she puts it, “to grow up and be somebody.” To promote these ends she works by day in the store and spends her evenings and Thursday afternoons cooking, washing and ironing, and making ice-box salads and desserts. Devoted to cultivating good taste in her children, she announces her creed in the words, “I buy nothing but the best,” and supports its validity by the observation that all the Hoes unerringly detect any deviation from Grade A. Aside from these aspirations, her general state of mind and body may be described by the word “fatigue.”

With respect to their children's careers, Mr. and Mrs. Hoe believe in the modern way of letting them do as they please. Darthula, who works in a tea room, has an income of \$18 per week which is sufficient to provide her with clothes and keep her hair in order. At times she takes a benevolent attitude toward her mother and the other members of the family, but being blonde and prim she cannot avoid the spirit of condescension. Her prestige is enhanced somewhat by her engagement to Neil Wallis, manager of the neighborhood grocery. However, she has no intention of marrying him until he is able to provide all the things which she wants. Under no consideration will she commit herself to the ill-fortunes concerning which the lines in her mother's face bear witness. She enjoys having a fiancé who owns a car which he is still paying for, but she rejects any further steps toward marriage until he is financially adequate, and on this subject she has her own specific estimates.

Dallas, the brother sandwiched between two sisters, is not an especially bright high school student. But he has ambitions nevertheless. Going to college and law school is to him a matter of life or death. Only one objective overshadows this goal and that is to win the hand of his vivacious classmate, Elinor Manning, daughter of the city's most distinguished surgeon.

Sythia, like all the other Hoes, can also tell without blinking precisely

what she wants. Her eyes are upon two closely related goals—a dancing career on the stage and the ultimate favor of Norman Fane whose sister, Cordelia, is an internationally famous danseuse. Whatever happens in the Hoe home during any week, seventy-five cents must be forthcoming to pay for Sythia's lesson in the second-rate ballet to which she belongs. The alternative is a tantrum.

In the light of this brief description of these personalities, it will help to sharpen our attention for what is to come if we make two general comments. In the first place, with the exception of Mr. Hoe all of the wishes of this family come in pairs, never singly. Everything they want requires something else to complete their satisfaction. We note, in the second place, that all the Hoes pursue their aims with a marked individualized intensity. This is illustrated by their conduct at the family meal when each approaches the table in a business-like manner, waits upon himself, and limits his participation in the conversation to the bare necessities of the occasion. This scene is symbolic of the family relationships. Each member moves in his own orbit and seldom collides seriously with any other. There is an underlying sense of interdependence and loyalty but these attitudes are rooted in the accidents of birth and a sort of sporting acknowledgment that each one has the right to do what he wants to do without interference.

The main problem in this family centers of course in the question of finance. Confused by the weary round of her daily routine, Mrs. Hoe begins to sense vaguely the need for some sort of order. She learns that a local newspaper maintains a budget service which those who desire such aid may have for the asking. So she writes to Mrs. Bradley, the expert in charge of this department, but with her usual disregard for arithmetic she fails to include any information about income and expenses. She asks only for "a budget for the ideal home, allowing for all the luxuries." Mrs. Bradley has no other alternative than to make a personal visit to the home and secure the necessary data. She discovers the facts which have already been recited, but finds in addition that payments on the house have been kept up only in part, that taxes are overdue plus 8%, that furniture, an electric refrigerator and a number of other appliances have been purchased on the installment plan. However, she promises to do what she can and requests Mr. Hoe to call at her office in a few days for the results of her figuring. At the appointed time he appears before her desk and is kindly

advised that the only course of wisdom for him to follow is to let the house go. In the logic of the neat column of figures set before him there is no other way. Besides, as Mrs. Bradley argues, it will be better to take a loss now than to wait for the inevitable course of events to produce a greater one later. To this, however, Mr. Hoe offers a stubborn resistance. He reminds Mrs. Bradley that he has been putting his hard-earned money into the property for nearly seven years. To see all of that go is unthinkable. Still more intolerable is Mrs. Bradley's suggestion that "some families manage better as tenants than as owners." His self-respect would be lost if he had to pay rent. Besides, in his view, taxpayers help the community. To own a home and pay taxes is patriotic. Moreover, he is building for the children. He wants them to be "good citizens interested in good government." His own parents were "rovers." They lived in a dozen towns during his boyhood. He has made sure that his children will have some abiding-place and not be the "victims of a landlord's greed." His fight is for security. He recalls his deep pride on the day he received the deed to the property. Under no circumstances can he take the expert's advice. Anyway, he reasons, perhaps the Home Owners Loan Corporation will act favorably on his application for a loan.

With Mr. Hoe adamant, Mrs. Bradley's next step is to interview Mrs. Hoe. She suggests that it will be more economical if Mrs. Hoe should give up her position and devote her whole time to household management. If she should do this, she could save as much or more, in the long run, than she is now earning. She would have time to do discriminating shopping and buy cheaper foods which she could prepare in an appetizing manner. To be sure, she might have to give up a few pieces of her overstuffed furniture or the refrigerator but that might happen anyway. To all this, Mrs. Hoe turns a deaf ear. That she can stop working is inconceivable. It takes all Mr. Hoe earns to hold the house, provide fuel, meet sewer assessments and pay the taxes. Without her income, they could not even buy food. Besides the children are dependent upon her for all their needs. Sythia must have her dancing lessons and a new costume for the spring festival, and Dallas will need a new suit for his graduation. As to the household appliances, a woman who works and whose time in the home is limited requires all the labor-saving devices that are available.

She is even considering the purchase of an electric mixer which is advertised to perform eighteen kitchen operations. Such things, in her situation, are not luxuries; they are necessities.

At her ironing in the evening, Mrs. Hoe beams upon her two younger children at their books. To her with less than an eighth grade education, they seem to be prodigies—in high school and well on their way to “being somebody!” But actually things are not going so well. Dallas is behind in Latin and Mathematics. He must have a tutor to help him get through, but there is no money for this purpose. An appeal to his Grandmother Darbac brings the sardonic reply that there are too many lawyers now and that to be a good one requires brains. This is a hard saying, but not enough to arrest the ambitions of a Hoe. Desperate at the thought of delaying his entrance into college and losing Elinor Manning, Dallas secretly diverts eight dollars which his father had laid away for insurance premiums. With this he engages a tutor for two weeks, but only to be advised by the principal shortly afterward that he cannot graduate; and that on the whole it would be better if he should go to work instead of planning for college. He accepts the inevitable about graduation, but vows that he will not go to work. Meanwhile he enters an advertising contest—one of those which require no special information or ability—with the hope of winning the ten thousand dollar prize. The lower altitudes of possibility are not to be entertained by a Hoe. However after spending some weeks in this venture, he comes to the place where a job seems desirable. So finally, through the efforts of Mrs. Bradley, and on the eve of Elinor’s graduation and departure for study in Paris, he accepts a position as her father’s chauffeur.

Of all the Hoes, Sythia affords us the most interesting exemplification of psychological theory. She conforms perfectly to the Adlerian formula of inferiority and compensatory striving. Awkward, irredeemably plain, her teeth out of line, she stands out in marked contrast to her blonde, artificial and painstakingly cultivated sister. Every waking moment of her life at home, she wears aluminum curlers hoping to induce her fine straight hair to twine into ringlets for more public occasions. She tells herself that if her mother fed her the right kind of food her hair might take a permanent. Sitting before the mirror she sees herself transformed into an angel floating in fragile costume down the stage, her golden slippers beating a magic tattoo upon the

heart of Norman Fane. Otherworldly arithmetic attains its greatest demonstration in Sythia. But it happens that she lives in this world. In group dancing her defects are obscured, but when she wrests from her teacher permission to take a solo part in the spring festival, she emerges a dismal failure. The dream evaporates in the crucible of reality. Finally, Grandmother Darbac salvages the wreck by bargaining sharply for vocational training with the result of settling Sythia as an operator in a beauty parlor.

A few other items bring us to the final events in the Hoe narrative. Neil Wallis, Darthula's fiancé, gives up his position in the grocery, partly because of embarrassment resulting from Mrs. Hoe's request for credit, but primarily to advance his income to the marrying point. He and a friend buy a farm near the city with the intention of turning it into cemetery lots and making a fortune. Mrs. Hoe is one of their first purchasers at one dollar down and one dollar per week. She reasons that it is a great comfort to know well in advance just who your neighbors are going to be when you pass beyond the realm of store counters and ironing boards. Eventually, however, Neil's venture in real estate passes into the hands of the receiver and he is forced to look for other work. It is not long before he is established in a dairy as the driver of a milk-wagon. To the Hoes this looks like menial labor, but another factor brings him greater disgrace in their eyes. He is required to join a union, an organization which they shun as the plague. So when Neil refuses to listen to their protestations, Darthula returns her ring. This act of hers, however, is in part the outcome of another series of events. Of late her interest has been increasingly centered upon a middle-aged widower who wears the marks of affluence. Some time after the break with Neil, this affair approaches the climax, but to Darthula's dismay her new prospect announces that he has three sons and is eager to re-establish a home for them. This is the most terrifying arithmetic she has ever heard of, so she turns the gentleman down.

With the refusal of the Home Owners Loan Corporation to grant a loan to Mr. Hoe, because "he is not the kind of a man to own a home," the stage is set for the final act. But the end for the rest of the family is not yet. Neil Wallis, through his contacts with the labor union forum, makes a new discovery. He learns that capitalism is the cause of all human ills, that wealth is becoming more and more

concentrated in the hands of a few people, and that as a result there are no longer enough jobs to go around. Moreover, the white collar workers are being progressively pushed down to the level of the manual workers. The middle class is disintegrating and the great proletariat is in the making. All of the dispossessed must unite for the coming struggle. Neil carries this propaganda to the Hoes. The older members of the family are horrified, but the disillusioned children are ready for the new philosophy. They become regular attendants at the meetings of the forum where they hear such arithmetic as this: "Suppose there's an apple orchard where everybody who wants to can go and get apples. Well, one year there are lots of apples and everyone has all he wants. The next year there's only enough apples for half as many people, but each person takes less, so they all have some. The third year there aren't any apples. No apples at all. Everybody shares when there are apples, everybody goes without when there aren't any apples. Nobody minds doing without apples, if no one has any. See?" The voice uttering these words is that of Sythia Hoe trying to convert her grandmother to the new way of thinking.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that when people who insist on believing that two and two equal eight finally discover that their answers are wrong, they start a revolution to overthrow arithmetic itself. But it must be remembered that these children and all their kind, from the kindergarten to the Ph. D., have been taught the great American doctrine that "all men are created equal," and they apply that principle to their situation with the same facility with which the "founding fathers" applied it to George III and the British mercantilists.

Perhaps we are now ready to say that what the Hoes need is a commanding authority to set them right. With some persuasion we may reason that people who are infantile in their behavior require some one to tell them what to do and to see that they do it. Here, we observe, is a situation which urgently demands some sort of dictator to bring order out of chaos. Those of us, however, who still have some faith in democracy, in the capacity of people to regulate themselves, would choose the way of understanding which calls for diagnosis, for the discovery of underlying causes and possible avenues of reconstruction. But when we adopt this approach, we are compelled to face not only the internal situation but also the objective situation or the community in which these people live. And when we do this

it becomes apparent that we do not stand entirely outside of the problem but are actually involved in the forces with which the people in this story are contending. In other words, our first observation reveals something important about the nature of human personality. The moment we begin diagnosis preparatory to relating ourselves in some helpful way to another, we are led to doubt the independent existence of any indivisible unity such as the personal pronoun "I" is used to designate. More and more the "I" seems to be only a frame or mask; at best, perhaps, an hypothesis; in reality, probably, to use Eddington's words, no more than a "pointer-reading" in a cosmos of social connections. This is to say that the "I" or the sense of self-conscious unity is not original but derivative. It is learned through the "my" or the experience of possession. The "my" in turn is derived from the relation of an object to some need which is satisfied by its presence—a rattle to bite on, a mother to care for one, or an electric refrigerator like Mrs. Jones'. Out of all these "mines," interactions between objects and persons, the biological individual acquires a unity of needs and objects, a system more or less under the control of choice which is the real significance of the "I." The self, then, is all of one's objects and persons interacting with each other in a system, and interacting with other systems or selves which in turn are made up of other objects and persons. All of these systems compose society. When two persons meet two systems of objects, persons, ideas, and values meet, not just two biological organisms. Our point is that no person can be understood apart from the community of persons and objects which he has incorporated and the resulting affects which give him his objective character.

In this light it is seen that disruption of personal living is not merely the result of some internal perversity but in no small degree an effect of a collaboration of forces which stand in blocs of opposition to one another and refuse to be reconciled. In other words, what we see in the case of the Hoes is what we see in the world generally, namely, an imbalance between centripetal (personal) and centrifugal (social) forces. In the world at large, disorders like the first World War and the economic depression have set free energies which were formerly organized under the control of established institutions and which must now make their way to new adjustments. The problem of life can, in fact, be reduced without too much simplification to the issue involved in a family budget. Income is centripetal; expenditure is cen-

trifugal; the budget is an organization of both in a state of equilibrium. This is the mathematics which governs human living as well as the stars in their courses.

Miss Lawrence's story brings into view another factor which operates throughout the range of human behavior. This is the need for prestige. Man is the kind of a being whose happiness depends upon the acquisition and maintenance of status among his fellows. What others think of us is tremendously important, for upon that we build our estimates of ourselves. This is the motivation for most human living. The Hoes, unable to accept themselves in terms of their own station and capacities, direct all their efforts toward translating themselves into other more acceptable categories. Dallas with only a moderate I. Q. cherishes the vision of college and the daughter of an outstanding citizen. Sythia with her plain personal appearance projects her dream upon the screen of the movie star. Darthula and Mrs. Hoe are committed to the belief that life consists in the abundance of things which give them standing with the Joneses. In all of these attitudes, they are simply trying to be a part of a national scene which stretches far beyond their doors to include millions who, like themselves, have no sales resistance.

It is easy to condemn the Hoes for their lack of realism. But as loudly as we moderns profess our devotion to this philosophy, observation of our own minds as well as those of others reveals the fact that realism as motivation is very rare. Everyone has his own subjective conception of what reality is and that never quite coincides with the objective situation. Blind spots are universal. Sythia Hoe holds the mirror up to much human nature when she describes her brother's outlook in terms of her own: "Dallas can't want what some one else says he ought to want: he wants what HE wants and whether it's all right or not, he's got to go on wanting it." This is a bald and distorted way of saying that few human beings can go very far without slipping into the well of their own subjectivism.

The two rocks on which the Hoes come to ruin are advertising and the installment plan. The purpose of the former is to inflate our wishes and the function of the latter is to give some semblance of reality to their immediate materialization. The annual advertising bill in the United States in normal times is about two billion dollars, which means that every man, woman and child in the country pays \$15 per year to have his wishes kept up to date. The peak of install-

ment selling in 1929 was seven billion dollars, which means, as the present state of the national budget also shows, that Americans are getting the habit of stealing the future. In terms of a settlement today we say of course that two and two equal four, but in terms of tomorrow two and two equal eight. If we take time captive we can beat arithmetic.

One would think that business concerns which maintain accountants and adding machines would be realistic. But when their activities are viewed in the perspective of events, such is not the case. In 1929, when it was the fashion to reach for the moon, even hard-headed bankers, the Gibralters of orthodox finance, went in for the higher mathematics. Samuel Insull, utility magnate, will probably go down in history as the man who dedicated his life to the proposition that two and two equal eight, and enhanced his fame by running half way around the world to escape another kind of arithmetic. Our individualist economy is trying frantically to distribute purchasing power and keep profits at a high level. To attain these objectives, the consumer is besieged with sales propaganda. But the consumer is also a worker who responds to advertising by a demand for higher wages in order that he may buy what the advertiser says is so desirable. Thus discontent among the workers is a direct result of the manufacturer's efforts to sell his goods. And as wages rise prices also advance with an inevitable tendency toward inflation and overproduction. Then Depression, that old schoolmaster who refuses to be converted to the higher mathematics, wipes the slate clean so we can start our errors all over again.

Finally, what shall we say of realism in religion? The facts do not permit us to paint the picture that we should like to look upon. Certain tendencies in organized religion point in the direction of bad arithmetic. Among these perhaps the most outstanding symptom is to be found in the trend toward ritualism. Now, fundamentally, the religion of ritualism or symbolism is the religion of the sedentary life, or, to put it in terms of a more recent vernacular, it is the religion of the "sit-down." The priest retires into the cloister to busy himself with the niceties of form, rhythm and diction, as though to say, "Lord, thou knowest my down-sitting." The prophet, however, stands upon the tower watching the massing armies of men afoot with dread intention and afire with explosive emotions. He waits impatiently for some "uprising" of the priest who seems meanwhile to

have turned his attention to developing a soft contentment in the little handful of devotees who sit before him, and to persuading them that if they only approach God according to a prescribed form, all will be well in the world. The prophet knows that life is motor, that worship has no justification except as a spiritual rehearsal for action, and that the character of worship should be in accord with the kind of action required. He knows too that God does not live under a Gothic arch laden with symbols whose relevancy is all too often remote from the needs of the masses of modern men. The priest seems to believe that God comes in the nuance of some sedative phrase; the prophet *sees* God coming in events. The priest may adore the Christ of the stained-glass window, but the prophet finds the real Christ "where cross the crowded ways of life" transmitting conflict into community. The priest assumes that the problem of life is solved by some mystic transaction in the viscera; the prophet knows that it is a matter of backbone. The prophet reads in the Gospel the story of a man who went about doing good and who put his most arresting words in terms of action. "He that heareth these words of mine and doeth them. . . . By their fruits ye shall know them." The prophet knows further that without ethical rigor, religion degenerates into hypocrisy and a striving after words, and that pious platitudes are the sin against the Holy Ghost. "If therefore thou art offering thy gift at the altar and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." That, says the prophet, is the kind of arithmetic that will balance the equation in Detroit, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin and the rest of the world.

We come now to the final issue in our diagnosis through reference to a fact of history and an insight of sociology. During the last century when the masses of common men were moving toward the frontier, it was the free churches, such as the Methodists and Baptists, which followed them and increased in strength and influence while the more formal liturgical churches lagged behind. In the light of this, it should give us some pause at a time when the masses are moving toward another frontier to find even the Baptists developing "high church" aspirations. In sociological terms, two of the signs of a loss of vitality in religion are ritualistic introversion and the alienation of the working classes. In this connection, another observation cannot be avoided.

During the day when we lived under an economy of scarcity, revivalism was an effective instrument for evangelizing the common people. It was possible then to say with some persuasion that a "man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things which he possesseth," that poverty here is the best guarantee of the high privilege of walking streets of gold and playing a harp in the heavenly orchestra "on the other side." But now under an economy of abundance, it is difficult to convince people that what the advertiser says is not true, or that the installment plan is not the way of salvation. More tragic still, it begins to look as though when such people as the Hoes discover that their arithmetic is wrong, they do not go to church to get converted, but go instead to the labor forum or some similar place to find out how to convert the system.

So the more we look at the situation, the more we incline to the view that the world in general is somewhat of a "case," that even the problem of religion is to balance the centripetal function of the priest with the centrifugal responsibility of the prophet in the budget of loyalty to God. Perhaps, then, the only remedy we can honestly prescribe for the Hoes and ourselves is that given by Paul, "The times of ignorance . . . God overlooked; but now he commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent."

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MINISTERS

The Prophets Tell Their Own Story. Elmer A. Leslie. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1939. Pp. 260 and notes, bibliography and indices. \$2.00.

The great prophets of the Old Testament are a perennial source of interest and inspiration for those who are interested in the promotion of ideals. The messages which they have given to the world construct the ideal from the materials of earthy and realistic nature in the midst of which their lives were cast. Professor Leslie presents eight of these prophets in dramatic fashion. He makes them speak about their lives and messages in the first person. This gives a freshness and color to the presentation.

The book contains the story of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Zephaniah, Nahum, Habakkuk, and Jeremiah. After reading the book one wishes that two others at least had been included, Ezekiel and the writer of Isaiah 40-55. The author's excuse for concluding with Jeremiah is that he "shares the judgment of the late Professor John Skinner that the prophetic religion of the Old Testament reaches its climax in Jeremiah."

This volume is an excellent exposition of the combination of biographical and expository materials in such fashion as to make preaching worth listening to. These great figures of the early periods of our religion live again and speak their eternal messages on the pages of Dr. Leslie's volume.

E. B. C.

Three Centuries of Advance. Kenneth Scott Latourette. N. Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1939. Pp. ix + 503. \$3.50.

This, the third volume of Dr. Latourette's monumental *History of the Expansion of Christianity*, covers the period from A.D. 1500 to 1800. The project grows more rather than less difficult as the geographical sweep of the Christian movement expands and the cultural situation correspondingly complicates. The period under review saw the birth of Protestantism and the first efforts of its earlier forms to domicile themselves outside northern and western Europe. Attention is, however, chiefly concentrated upon the remarkable expansion of Roman Catholic Christianity, particularly in the earlier part of this period. Such a summary as that of Chapter III, which deals with Spanish America, makes us aware of new tides of interest and power, due in part to the Counter-Reformation; while the portrayal in Chapter VI, "Protestantism in the Americas," traces vigorous new lines of expansion no longer under the aegis of Rome.

In dealing with a very extensive and complicated mass of material, Dr. Latourette has achieved and maintained his perspective in notable fashion. A fine Introductory Chapter gives us in a few swift strokes the main outlines of the epoch with which the volume deals. Then, for fourteen chapters, varying widely in length and scope of treatment, we proceed in the main by geographical areas. Chapter XVI, one of the longest in the book, fruitfully analyzes "The Effect of Christianity upon the Environment." Chapter XVII in turn notes "The Effect of

the Environment upon Christianity; while a final chapter offers a brief summary and a glance ahead, toward the three volumes of the work yet to be published.

Any such work must depend largely upon the use of authorities, although here, as in the earlier volumes, there is considerable direct use of source material. The 27 pages of annotated Bibliography appended to the volume present 425 items (works, periodicals, journals, etc.) to which more than a single reference is made, in the text. There are 1967 footnotes, some 395 of them in the long chapter on Spanish America alone. A careful Index greatly adds to the value of the work for reference use. No reference library can afford to be without this work, and it ought to find its place in many private libraries.

H. B. R.

The Flowering of Mysticism. Rufus M. Jones. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. Pp. 270. \$2.50.

Not until he had retired from teaching in 1934, did Professor Jones find time to explore, in the British Museum, at Strasbourg and at Berlin, the fourteenth century outburst of mystical religion in western Europe, a field which had won his interest in his student days, and upon which he had touched briefly in his *Studies in Mystical Religion* (1909). In the meantime his conception both of the significance of mysticism and of its basic structure has changed. Professor Jones declares that "the deepest spiritual piety of the modern world, and, as well, the rise of the Baptists, the Quakers and the Methodists" link up with this early movement.

The first three chapters afford a general introduction to the study and the background of the period. Then, in Meister Eckart, he comes upon "the Peak of the Range"—the greatest figure in fourteenth century Christian mysticism. The discussion naturally moves next to "Johannes Tauler, the Preacher." We are subsequently introduced to Rulman Merswin, the Friends of God and the books of the Green Isle community. Following studies of Heinrich Suso and certain women mystics, and a sketch of the content of three anonymous mystical books of the period, we have a careful study of Jan Ruysbroeck, the greatest of the Flemish Mystics. After a significant chapter on "The Flowering of Mysticism in England" and a sketch of Gerard Groote, "the last great creative figure" among the Rhenish Friends of God, we have, in a concluding chapter, a fresh statement of "The Nature of Mystical Experience."

This is a work of great value to the student of mysticism, and of genuine interest to the historian of Christianity as well as to the general reader. It is well documented and carefully indexed.

H. B. R.

The Church and a Christian Society. Wade Crawford Barclay. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1939. Pp. 428. \$3.50.

For a long time we have needed a competent book on the philosophy and psychology of religious education written from the standpoint of the progressive movement within the evangelical churches. Because of its Christian philosophy,

its warm enthusiasm, its closely-knit unity of historical, social, and personal analysis with curriculum, its clarity of statement, its comprehensiveness, this book will attain a large, enduring, and deserved popularity. For this is primarily, as its title-page asserts, "A discussion of aims, content, and method of Christian education," and only secondarily, as the publishers' jacket affirms, "A discussion of adult Christian education." This is, of course, as it ought to be.

The organizing principle of Dr. Barclay's approach is Jesus' law of love. This becomes the basis of his extensive critique of present-day society both for its "excessive enrichment of the few and the exploitation of the many together with the moral degradation of both" (page 192). It is also the basis of the Christian social order, as he sees it, "the family of God," and extension to all mankind of the idea of the Christian family. And finally it is the basic factor in his pedagogy, for the best pedagogy is undoubtedly the give and take of a friendly group engaged in some genuine ongoing activity.

One of the truly remarkable characteristics of Dr. Barclay's treatment is his balanced point of view. Doubtless he gives more space to the social implications of the gospel than to the individual, but the social gets its value from the personal. And if he insists upon social salvation, he insists with equal vigor upon personal salvation; indeed he can conceive of neither apart from the other. Likewise he maintains the balance between the religious education of childhood and of adulthood, though here of course his emphasis is upon the latter. When he analyzes the individual personality, he does not lose the physical in the psychical, still less the intellectual or the emotional or the volitional in one or the other of these aspects of mental life. It is refreshing to read a book on adult education that plainly says that the millennium is not coming because of multiplied classes or public forums. Indeed, while Dr. Barclay gives full weight to worship, and instruction, and the various discussion types of guidance, and to service, his real emphasis is upon "social participation," whatever form it takes; or even more fundamentally, upon the theme of his last and climactic chapter, "*Life is the Curriculum.*" One will find more complete treatments of the process of instructing adults, e. g., Mueller's; but Dr. Barclay gives quite enough for any thoughtful leader, and he gives it as part of a comprehensive discussion of personality formation and social advance.

There are weak spots in the book. Dr. Barclay insists that the Christian society *must* be a planned and planning society. He can see no other alternative. But "is it possible to plan efficiently and to enforce the plans agreed upon, through the use of democratic instrumentalities? Or does planned production for use inevitably mean the totalitarian State? . . . To these questions no one can return a dogmatic answer. . . ." (page 186). If Dr. Barclay were less sincere or less thoughtful, he would not have written this, though the critics would have written it against him and his planned economy, which is for him the Christian State. But if the Christian State turns out to be a totalitarian State, does not this sadly weaken the entire argument?

Again, the argument of the earlier part of the book is to a considerable degree based upon Rauschenbusch's interpretation of the phrase, "the Kingdom of God." He writes: "A unique concept given to the world and the Church by Jesus is

that of the Kingdom of God, the Beloved Society within which men live in fellowship with God as Father and with all men as brothers. . . . This rediscovery of the original gospel . . . is so significant that it constitutes nothing less than a compelling mandate to the Church. . . . The Church is called upon to translate Jesus' concept of the Kingdom into terms of today's life, to lead its members to understand what it means both in personal and collective life, and what these meanings demand in social, economic, and political reconstruction" (page 131). Yet on page 269, we read: "At first regarded as a rediscovery of the original teaching of Jesus, in more recent years there has been increasing agreement among Biblical theologians that the conception expressed in the term 'building the Kingdom of God,' has little or no historical foundation." Dr. Barclay finds himself facing the eschatological interpretation of Jesus, a point of view which must be recognized and considered at an early point in his discussion. For it is not merely the phrase, the Kingdom of God, which is at stake, but the question of the entire interpretation of Jesus' life and teaching.

Nevertheless, every person engaged in the religious education of adults (and what religious leader is not?), will want to read and own this book, both because it is perhaps the best treatment of adult religious education, and because of its basically sound philosophy and psychology of religious education. References, quotations, questions, and bibliography add greatly to its value. Incidentally the publishers are to be congratulated not only upon producing a worthy and attractive book, but also in giving us a large volume which is at the same time light in weight.

F. O. E.

Games for parties and Social Occasions, by James W. Kemmerer.
Minneapolis, The Northwestern Press, 2200 Park Avenue, 1939.
Pages 140. Paper covers.

Mr. Kemmerer has written this inexpensive book because of his own need for ready access to easy and interesting games for his young people's parties. He has laid under contribution a considerable number of old stand-bys, but there are many favorites not so well known. While the author has had indoor situations chiefly in mind, there are numerous suggestions for the out-of-doors as well. The variety is large as will be seen from the twelve chapter headings: Games for Special Occasions, Circle and Line Games, Relays and Races, Miscellaneous Contests, Trick and Mystery Games, Charades and Stunts, Games for Little Tots, Songs for Group Singing and Musical Games, Folk Dances, Skill Games, Choral Speaking, and Suggestions for Party Costumes. Directions for playing are clear and can easily be followed. The book begins with a few pertinent and basic principles governing church social life in general, and concludes with a well-chosen bibliography and a copious index. No costly or difficult equipment or costumes are required. Vacation school directors, as well as pastors, will find here an almost complete answer to their perennial recreational problem.

F. O. E.

Girls' Clubs of National Organization in the United States—Their Development and Present Status, by Helen Gilchrist Fudge. Philadelphia. Printed by the Westminster Press, 1939. Pages 349. Price \$2.00.

In these days when everyone is concerned about the youth of America, this careful study of girls' clubs having a national organization is of outstanding importance. Inasmuch as nearly every educator regards the factor of social participation as highly or even primarily significant in personality development, this book becomes doubly valuable in presenting an astonishing array of girls' societies with their objectives and internal arrangements. Further, as the Maryland Survey reported the majority of young people who were interviewed as placing recreational and social life at the top of their interests, it becomes increasingly important to know how America is meeting the need.

The author organizes her material under five headings. First come the Protestant organizations, denominational and interdenominational. Second are five Catholic young women's national organizations; third are seven Jewish groups of similar scope; fourth are Patriotic, Political, Fraternal, and Labor Organizations, including such widely diverse groups as, the International Order of Good Templars, Children of the American Revolution, Young Peoples' Socialist League, Young Communist League, Junior Chapter Women of the Moose, Polish National Alliance, and many others; fifth, are the Leisure, Recreation, and Special Interest Organizations, including such different societies as the 4-H Clubs, Girl Scouts, Junior Audubon Clubs, American Turnbund, American Sokol Union, and so forth.

Protestant organizations, generally speaking, work "along the line of character development and civic education. There is no contribution to the objectives of health or of vocational training." (p. 72). Catholic societies have "the major aim to prepare the young people to carry on the cause of Catholic action" (p. 72). "In the seven Jewish organizations studied there appear the common aims of the advancement of Judaism and the upbuilding of Palestine as the Jewish National Homeland." (p. 73). "The greatest contribution in this (the fourth) group is along the line of civic education, but there is a marked diversity as to the kind of education implied." (p. 75). The societies of Group 5, as a group, emphasize in this order,—“citizenship, ethical character, command of the fundamental processes, avocational interests and recreation, health, worthy home-membership, and vocational training.” (p. 79).

Dr. Fudge gives a complete list of all these many organizations, headquarter's address, publications, purposes, geographical extent in general, and approximate numbers where these are available. A good bibliography gives material additional to handbooks.

This would seem to be an *indispensable* book for all workers with young people.

F. O. E.

One in Seven. Margaret Slattery. Harper and Brothers, New York. 1939. Pp. XII+133. \$1.25.

The friends of Miss Slattery, and they are many, will welcome this little volume of devotional addresses. She suggests that on at least one day in seven there should be a period of retirement from ordinary activities for meditation and self-examination. As an aid to this she has condensed and adapted in these chapters much that she has given in public addresses. Her appeal is particularly to youth but their elders also will find guidance and inspiration here. J. F. V.

To Every Creature. Henry Burton Trimble. The Cokesbury Press, Nashville. 1939. Pp. 159. \$1.

Dean Trimble believes thoroughly in evangelism. He sees it as the supreme task of the church. He exalts no one form of it as superior to others but reviews and evaluates various types of evangelistic activity. All can be used and made to reinforce each other. The author makes an urgent plea for evangelism and presents a thorough-going discussion which any minister, or layman either for that matter, can read with profit. J. F. V.